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Abstract 
Starting from a recent controversy on the Schumpeterian hypothesis of 
innovation clusters, a quantitative indicator of "innovation intensity" 
for 30 sectors of West German industry is calculated. The indicator is 
based on an international sample of 500 innovation cases, innovated 
during the time-span from 1953 to 1973. A comparison with a sample of 
100 major innovations for the 20th century is made. The latter sample 
shows a highly significant clustering tendency of radical product 
innovations during the crises period of the 1930's. By means of the 
sample from the 1953 to 1973 period, the hypothesis is tested that 
during the 1950's and 60's innovative activity moves along the path that 
was initiated by major product innovations from the inter-war period 
("band-wagon" effect). Evaluation of the 1953-73 sample yields the 
following results: (1) the "innovation intensity" of sectors corresponds 
with the one-tailed sectoral distribution pattern in the sample of major 
innovations, thus giving strong evidence for the existence of a "band-
wagon"-effeet. (2) The uneven sectoral distribution of innovations is 
relatively continuous during the entire 21 year investigation period. 
(3) A high degree of correlation between "innovation intensities" of sectors and 
sectoral production growth gives support to the hypothesis that, during 
the West German "Wirtschaftswunder" period, economie development was 
strongly influenced by the rise of "Schumpeterian" growth industries. 
(4) During the 1960's, the above-mentioned degree of correlation is 
gradually weakening, and, entering the present crises period, it 
disappears. The fading out of positive growth prospects seems to be 
associated with a decline of innovation performance (decline in the 
number and in the degree of importance of innovations, shifting from 
product to process innovations). (5) During the 1953-73 period,. the 
time distribution of innovations reveals a remarkable adherence to 
general business cycle fluctua'tions. 
Theoretical discussion refers to the interplay of innovation and 
demand, the impact of risks and incentives on R & D strategies in 
prosperity and crisis, "science push" explanations, and the importance 
of government demand for radical innovation projects. From the above 
view, the innovation factor should no more be conceived as an exogenous 
variable. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: INNOVATION AND GROWTH PERFORMANCE OF INDUSTRIES 
This paper deals with innovation patterns and their interplay with long-
term growth performance in industry. It is based upon research concerning 
West Germany's post-war economie development, which is characterized by 
a striking contrast between a longer period of stable and sustained 
growth in the 1950's and 60's and the crises phenomena of the 1970's. 
The basic idea, linking innovation patterns to economie growth, is not 
new. Already before Schumpeter it occupied the interest of Simon Kuznets. 
In his "Secular Movements in Production and Prices", he pointed out: 
"In many industries there comes a time when the basic technical conditions 
are revolutionized ... In all these cases we observe a revolutionary 
invention or discovery applied to the industrial process which becomes the 
chief method of production ... When such a change occurs, the industry 
grows very rapidly. The innovation is rarely perfect at the start, and 
further improvements take place continually after the main invention or 
discovery. The use of the continually improving and cheapening commodity 
spreads to larger areas, overcoming obstacles which may have limited 
demand in the past. Population grows and helps to swell the total volume 
of output. But with all this, after a time the vigorous expansion 
slackens and further development is not so rapid." 
It may be due to the continued post-war boom in most Western countries 
that this attempt of Kuznets as well as the Sehumpeterian paradigm drifted 
into the background of economie literature. Prosperity times are bad 
times for theories of crises and fluctuations, and vice versa: The present 
crises phenomena seem to have revived interest in this kind of theorizing. 
Independently of each other, the above mentioned thought of Kuznets has 
been taken up by several theorists. An early contribution came from 
G. Mensch linking clusters of what he calls "basic innovations" with 
2) 
patterns of longer term economie change. 
Other attempts were made from the background of theories on "long waves". 
For example C. Freeman emphasized the impact of innovation on labour-
3) 
market developments , and Van Duyn dealt with the concept of an S-shaped 
"life-cycle" of new products and sectors in the form of the Gompertz-
4) 
curve. 
Presently, theoretical and empirical aspects of such approaches are being 
debated in the literature. Especially the empirical evidence of "long 
waves" in economie life, i.e. the so-called Kondratieff-cycles with a 
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supposed wave-length of 45 to 60 years is subject to s-trong controversies. ' 
Here, these discussions can not be reviewed. As Ipointedout elsewhere, 
there are indeed some indications in several European countries for the 
existence of longer periods of sustained growth ("A -periods") from the 
1890's to World War I, and from the late 1940's to the late 1960's, as 
well as for "B-periods" of weaker and more unstable economie development 
during the 1870's and 1880's, and between the two World Wars. However, 
we should not deal with this phenomenon in terms of rigid long cycle 
models: The methodological difficulties of such an approach are 
prohibitive. 
In an earlier paper I have tried to test the basie innovations approach 
of G. Mensen for West German industry. This approach can be sketched 
as follows: Basic or major innovations are unequally distributed in time. 
They tend to cluster in "B-periods" of economie distress. From the list 
of basic innovation cases which Mensch distilled out of the work of 
8) 
Jewkes, Sawers and Stillerman he concluded that, m the 20th century, 
there is indeed a tendency for basic innovations to cumulate during the 
1930's. Basic innovations are defined as giving the basis for new and 
rapidly growing industries or, (as process innovations) to lead to 
radical changes in already existing industries. When several new growth 
industries are initiated at about the same time, their rise may give 
the basis for a longer lasting period of relative prosperity. 
Is it possible to relate the period of relative prosperity from the end 
of the 1940's to the end of the 1960's to growth spurts, which were 
initiated by a cluster of "basic innovations" in the inter-war period? 
Grouping the basic innovations from the Mensch-Jewkes list to industries, 
I discovered that they concentrate in the following sectors: Electrical 
and electronics industry, chemical industry (incl. synthetic fibres and 
drugs), plastics manufacturing, petroleum refining, aircraft construction 
and (somewhat) in the automobile industry. From a comparison of production 
growth in 48 sectors of West German manufacturing and mining industry 
from 1950-1977 it became evident that these "innovation industries" are 
indeed the sectors leading in production growth throughout the 1950's 
and 1960's. Moreover, it turned out that the innovative growth impetus 
declines with time, and during the 1970's, these "innovation industries" 
adapted more and more to the generally weakening level of production 
9) 
growth m industry as a whole. 
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From this I concluded that the thrust-wise achievement of major innovations 
(besides other factors such as the reconstruction boom, the oversuppply 
of cheap labour, etc.) should have an outstanding importance for an 
explanation of the striking contrast between the crises phenomena of the 
1930's and 1970's and the prosperity period of the 1950's and 1960's. 
II. CLUSTERING OF MAJOR INNOVATIONS? A CONTROVERSY 
Meanwhile, the theoretical and empirical evidence of Mensch's hypothesis 
about a cluster of basic innovations during the recession period of the 
1930's has become strongly criticized. J. Clark, C. Freeman and L. Soete 
have argued that clusters in time of innovations (if there are any at all) 
should rather be expected to occur during periods of prosperity and boom: 
"To suggest that this would be more likely to occur during depression 
flies in the face of all economie theory of whatever description ... 
It also contradicts the evidence of case-histories of innovation, and the 
general consensus that high risks are one of the main factors inhibiting 
innovation". Moreover they call into question the empirical 
representativeness of Mensch's innovation sample (size of the sample and 
selection principles). 
How can it be checked, whether or not the criticism of Clark/Freeman/Soete 
is justified? At the present state of the art, it might be regarded as 
rather ambitious, if not impossible, to construct a list which covers the 
population of major or basic innovations of the 20th century. It seems 
to be more realistic to test the clustering hypothesis by taking random 
samples out of the unknown population of important innovations of the 20th 
century. 
In a separate paper I have evaluated a collection of 120 case studies 
given by K.B. Mahdavi , which, for the purpose of testing the clustering 
12) hypothesis, can be regarded to be randomly selected. As 100 out of 
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120 cases of Mahdavi fall into the 20th century, I suppose that they 
can be considered as a representative sample, indicating some major 
patterns of innovative activity during the 20th century. It is an 
advantage of the Mahdavi study, that he was not looking for "basic 
innovations". He was just taking "important innovations" (without 
further defining the term "importance") and therefore his sample 
covers very different types of innovations: radically new products, 
new production processes for already known products and decisive 
improvements of products. In the above-quoted paper I grouped Mahdavi's 
cases after types of innovations and discovered the following distribution 
patterns: 
- radically new product innovations (coming near the definition of 
"basic innovations" like given by Mensch) tend indeed to cumulate 
2 
in the 1930's. By means of the one-sampleX test it can be stated 
that there is only a probability of 0.001 that such a distribution 
could occur as a mere chance variation. This result can be interpreted 
as confirming what I called the "depression triggering"-hypothesis of 
innovation clusters; 
- innovations of the improvement and process type tend somewhat to 
cluster in prosperity periods. This clustering tendency does not 
2 
stand theX. one sample test: There remain probabilities between 0.1 
and 0.5 that these clusters could be chance variations. 
13) 
With the publication of the special issue of FUTURES in August 1981 ' 
the above controversy moved another step forward. Whereas in his 
introductory notes, C. Freeman expresses some reservations on the 
. . . 14) 
empirical representativeness of the Mahdavi-sample , in a co-authored 
article, Clark/Freeman/Soete do not refuse principally the possibility 
of some clustering tendencies during the 1930's, and their own data on 
key and master patents in Great Britain give some support for this 
position. Nonetheless, they maintain their criticism of the notion of 
"depression-triggering" and suggest that such clusters (like e.g. in 
plastics and synthetics) have no clear-cut relationship with the overall 
level of economie activity, but should better be explained in terms of 
a "science-push" as well as by government intervention. 
The latter point can be supported from the outcome of the Mahdavi-
sample, that during the 1930's and 40's there is indeed a strong 
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influence on innovation processes by government financed armament 
activities. This should be reason enough not to look for merely 
economie explanations of innovation clusters, ignoring the retro-
active influence of social and political relationships, which 
themselves are subject to changes as a consequence of economie crises. 
Probably the most dramatic substantiation of this argument during the 
inter-war period comes from Germany: The rise of fascism and its 
collaboration with big business (TG Farben etc). Moreover, it turned 
out that a simple notion of the "depression-triggering"-effect ("The 
stronger the crises, the more firms will innovate ...") does not hold: 
Radical product innovations concentrated in sectors which seemed to be 
less severely hit by the crisis than the average. 
But what about the alternative science-push explanation? As presented 
by Clark/Freeman/Soete the argument must be understood as an exogenous 
explanation of long-term fluctuations: the economy receives a strong 
innovative impulse from erratic developments in natural sciences, which 
themselves are not influenced by socio-economic factors. Must the 
problem be delegated to natural sciences or is it possible to give an 
endogenous explanation of science-push effects? Let us review the above 
controversy. 
Clark/Freeman/Soete argued that high risks and uncertainties are one 
of the main factors inhibiting innovations during periods of prolonged 
crises. This is certainly a correct point. I argued in my above-
mentioned paper, however, that we have to compare risks with incentives: 
During periods of prosperity, innovation risks may be lower, but so may 
be the incentive to innovate. Why should an enterprise finance relatively 
long-term projects on radical product innovations as long as its 
established products have positive market prospects? Again judging from 
the Mahdavi case studies, it is evident that for many innovation 
projects which were finished during the 1930's, substantial inventions 
and even development steps were already performed during the prosperity 
periods that went before. However, such projects were often dropped again 
when they hit an important technical obstacle which hindered a prompt 
market introduction. During prosperity periods, firms seem to be forced 
to withstand competition by introducing quality improving and cost 
reducing innovations for their current products, and as long as these 
are running well in the market, the tendency to concentrate R & D 
facilities hereon seems to leave no chance for continued expenditures 
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on radically new projects, the market chances for which are quite 
uncertain. Perhaps this latter hypothesis may be conceived as 
somewhat speculative and not easy to test. But insofar as it is 
valid, it is also reasonable to assume that during prosperity periods 
a stock of radical projects which have been started but not 
consequently continued, will be stored in R & D departments. Moreover, 
when we assume that results of basic sciences are achieved randomly 
over time, the lack of economie interest to translate them into 
practical use during periods of sustained growth would explain that 
a stock of results from basic sciences is stored. The innovative 
potential of such a stock of knowledge can be explored in a thrust-
wise way, when economie crisis induces a change in the R & D strategy 
of firms. 
The term "depression-triggering" might be misleading insofar as economie 
conditions during longer depression phases do not make it easy to 
exploit such a science-push potential. On the other hand, the congestion 
in existing product markets, chronic overcapacities, and bad prospects 
for further R & D investments in established product lines (especially 
when dealing with relatively matured products) give a strong incentive 
to look for alternative R & D projects and investment spheres just in 
crises periods. In other words: The contradictions around the notion of 
"depression-triggering" are but a theoretical expression of the 
contradictory setting of the problem in reality: The strongest incentives 
for risky innovations are just given in times when risks and uncertainties 
are at their highest - for radical innovations and for investments in 
existing lines of production. According to this argument, different types 
of innovations are expected to concentrate at different periods of time: 
Radical product innovations - the alleged basis for new Schumpeterian 
industries - should accumulate as a consequence of prolonged crises 
phenomena, whereas the large stream of improvement and process innovations 
which accompany the rise of Schumpeterian industries should be quite 
closely related to the expansionary movements of capital accumulation. 
Clark/Freeman/Soete obviously meant this latter type of innovation when 
pointing out: "Mensch has been looking at the wrong 'swarms'. The swarms 
which matter in terms of Schumpeterian analysis are the diffusion swarms 
after the basic innovations and the swarming effects associated with a 
18) 
set of interrelated basic innovations ..." 
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It may be that the hypothesis about the clustering of major innovations 
as a consequence of economie distress will be subject to further 
controversial discussion. To discuss the policy implications of this 
topic more fully, however, I would like to suggest that we settle the 
controversy in still another way: Is the upswing movement primarily 
induced by the dynamics of the new growth industries, as suggested in 
the subtitle of Mensch's book ("Innovations Overcome Depression") or 
is the main emphasis laid on the upswing movement (being primarily 
caused by factors other than innovation), which prolongs itself by 
facilitating the rise of the new Schumpeterian industries? Clark/Freeman/ 
Soete seem to sympathize with the latter position when pointing out 
that "... the immediate effect of 10 or 20 basic innovations is negligible 
in the first few years of their introduction, as well as in the gestation 
period. The resources committed are absolutely tiny compared with the 
scale of investment involved in the large-scale follow-through of these 
basic innovations with the concomitant development of entirely new 
branches of industry, supporting services, component industries, materials 
19) 
supplies and so forth". 
Both positions obviously have quite different policy implications. Mensch 
seems to have a stronger confidence in the dynamics of the innovation 
process. Even in a situation of general demand weakness, new Schumpeterian 
industries will grow rapidly and will become the impetus for a new 
upswing movement. From such a view, less government regulation is demanded 
than from the more pessimistic view of the opposite position: Once a 
major innovation is introduced, the consecutive "band-wagon" of related 
innovations and R & D-activities which accompanies the rise of the new 
industry, will only be set in motion when, in general, demand prospects 
are positive. From this it can be concluded that an expansionary keynesian 
demand policy should be an important ingrediënt of a successful innovation 
policy. 
Do innovation products create their demand independently of the business 
cycle? Or is an upswing necessary to start the rise of new Schumpeterian 
industries? The study of Schmookler, taking patents as an indicator of 
innovativeness, revealed a time-lag between growth and patenting, thus 
20) giving strong support to the "demand-pull" position. On the other 
hand there is also some evidence for Mensch's position: Looking for 
example at the development of the electronics industry during the last 
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ten years, there is indeed the impression that a Schumpeterian industry 
performs an excellent career quite independently of the status of the 
business cycle. My above quoted results on the relationships of basic 
innovations and production growth seem at first to provide evidence 
for Menseh's position. In its initial phase, however, West German post-
war growth also got a strong impetus from a reconstruction boom. 
Therefore, the observed pattern could as well as be interpreted as 
supporting the demand-pull position. Thus, from the background of the 
above data, the controversy remains open. However, there should not be 
any doubt that it earns future investigation. 
Independently of the question as to which one of the above positions 
will receive support by future research, it should be important to know 
how much evidence there is for a relationship between the cluster of 
major innovations during the inter-war period and the post-war innovative 
activity. Do innovation patterns of the 1950's and 60's indicate the 
existence of a "band-wagon"-effect or of a "large-scale follow-through" 
of major innovations as emphasized by Clark/Freeman/Soete? 
Looking at the Mahdavi sample, Clark/Freeman/Soete certainly are 
primarily interested in the distribution of improvement and process type 
innovations, which have some (weak) cumulation tendencies during the 
prosperity periods. My guess is, however, that they would like to 
measure the stream of "band-wagon" innovations in another way than 
Mahdavi. Mahdavi was looking for "important innovations", and it seems 
realistic to assume that he principally took cases of outstanding 
importance. It may be argued, however, that besides the spectacular 
advances, the more numerous series of smaller steps is a decisive element 
of the "band-wagon". Consequently, the above-quoted result on improvement 
and process innovations (acceptance of the random-walk hypothesis) has 
to be interpreted in its proper perspective: There is no significant 
clustering of outstanding improvement and process innovations during 
the longer-term prosperity periods. This does not exclude the possibility 
that the large stream of smaller advances is fairly well correlated with 
economie fluctuations as suggested by the results of Schmookler. 
As the Mahdavi data obviously underestimate the real extent of the 
"band-wagon" we need another sample as an indicator of post-war innovative 
activity. Therefore, in the following chapter, I shall use the innovation 
cases which are covered by a government report of S. Feinman and W. 
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21) 
Fuentevilla from 1976. This report tried to mvestigate 500 
innovation cases. These innovations were collected on a six countries 
basis (USA, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Japan, and Canada) the 
investigation period reaching from 1953 to 1973. 
Looking at the sectoral distribution of these innovations, the 
following 3 hypotheses should be tested: 
a) "band-wagon hypothesis": Do the innovation cases from the Feinman/ 
Fuentevilla sample concentrate in the same sectors as do the major 
innovations from the inter-war period? 
b) "continuity hypothesis": presumed that the above "band-wagon" 
hypothesis is realistic: Is the sectoral distribution of the 
Feinman/Fuentevilla cases relatively constant over the entire 
21 year investigation period? 
c) "innovation-effeet hypothesis": Is there a correlation between the 
sectoral distribution of innovative activity and growth performance 
of the individual sectors? 
III. AN INDICATOR OF INNOVATION INTENSITY: THE FEINMAN/FUENTEVILLA SAMPLE 
III.1. Construction of the Indicator 
By means of a voluminous questionaire, the authors tried to find out 
some characteristic patterns of the innovation process. Eventually, for 
some 380 out of the 500 cases a somewhat complete questionaire could be 
accomplished. One of the questions referred to the degree of radicalness 
of the innovation, giving 6 possibilities to answer: 
R - radical breakthrough 
M = major technological shift 
IMP = improvement 
I = imitation 
NO = no new technological knowledge required 
? = not known 
Answers about the degree of radicalness could be obtained in 379 out of 
500 cases. Thus there are two possibilities for construction of a 
quantitative indicator of innovativeness: 
- the 379 cases for which information about the degree of radicalness 
is given, can be grouped by industrial sectors, giving to each 
innovation a specific weight according to its degree of radicalness. 
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- all the 500 cases can be grouped by sectors without regard for their 
relative importance. 
The second possibility has the advantage of a larger sample and the 
disadvantage of adding up innovations which might have a quite 
different importance. Using the first possibility, the weighting procedure 
might be conceived as arbitrary, and we do not know to what extent the 
(subjective) judgements of firms on the degree of radicalness are reliable. 
Therefore I decided to use both possibilities and to compare their final 
outcome before using them for test. 
The indicator of innovativeness for the different sectors of West-German 
industry has been constructed as follows: As a first step, each case was 
grouped to the innovating sector within the United States' Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC), according to the SIC-numbers as given 
by Feinman/Fuentevilla. The numbers of innovations per SIC-sector, 
grouped after degree of radicalness, are documented in table 1 of the 
Appendix. In the same table, I tried to adapt the relatively fine 
classification scheme of the SIC to the rougher classification level of 
the "Index of Sectors and Branches". The latter one is the basis of the 
statistical series for West German industry to be used further below. 
22) 
They are published by the DIW (German Institute for Economie Research). 
In general, the individual subdivisions of the SIC can be grouped to 
the sectors of the DlW-classification without difficulties. There are 
only problems with some subsectors in the DlW-system which are not quite 
compatible with the corresponding SIC-sectors. In these cases,-I preferred 
2 
to work only with the principal sector mstead of taking its subdivisions. 
Thus manufacturing and mining in the DlW-classification is finally 
subdivided into 30 sectors. 319 out of the 379 cases which are classified 
by degree of radicalness fall into manufacturing or mining industry, and 
are grouped to one of these 30 sectors. 413 out of the non-classified 500 
cases fall into manufacturing or mining. The remainder are distributed over 
construction industry, service industries, transportation and so forth, 
which are no longer covered by the DlW-data. 
In table 2 of the Appendix, the numbers of innovations for the 30 DIW 
sectors are given. Column 1 covers those 413 (out of 500) cases which 
were added up without regard of their degree of radicalness. Column 2 
contains those 319 (out of 379) cases which are weighted by degree of 
radicalness. Weighting was made in a simple way: as there are 6 different 
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degrees of radicalness, I multiplied the innovations with the highest 
degree of radicalness by 6, innovations with the second highest degree 
by 5, and so forth til down to the lowest degree (factor 1). 
As the individual sectors of the DlW-classification are quite different 
in size, a correction factor had to be introduced. As suitable correction 
factors for differing sector sizes I took alternatively the relative 
shares of the individual sectors in total production and in total 
employment in 1963 (the median year of the Feinman/Fuentevilla in-
vestigation period). Both correction factors have a somewhat different 
meaning: Dividing the number of innovations by the production shares, 
the result can be interpreted as a kind of "innovation intensity of 
production output", whereas the outcome of a division by employment 
shares indicates a kind of "innovation intensity of the labour force" 
in the respective sectors. 
Comparing the 4 different innovation intensities in table 2 (Appendix) 
it can be stated that it does not make much difference whether to take 
the weighted or the non-weighted innovation cases for calculating the 
innovation intensity: Gorrelating column 5 with column 7 we get a 
correlation coëfficiënt of 0.992 and for column 9 with column 11 the 
correlation coëfficiënt amounts to 0.995. Correction for sector size 
by using alternatively production and employment shares seems to create 
a bit more difference: The correlation coëfficiënt between columns 5 and 
9 is 0.883 and amounts to 0.905 when correlating columns 7 and 12. This 
lower degree of correlation may come from the fact that the two correction 
factors yield somewhat different rankings in the case of highly capital 
intensive sectors (cf. for example petroleum refining). 
It is certainly reasonable to relate the sectoral numbers of innovations 
to production shares. However, the number of innovations divided by 
employment shares has the advantage to be more harmonious with labour 
productivity measurement: Insofar as sectors wdth high innovation 
intensities have a higher growth of labour productivity, their production 
shares are supposed to grow quicker than their employment shares. Thus 
their innovation intensity becomes somewhat lower when dividing by their 
(1963) production shares instead of taking the employment shares of the 
same year. This argument has some importance for the interpretation of 
the ranklists from table 2 to be made in the following chapter: Petroleum 
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refining takes rank 14 in columns 6 and 8, and reaches rank 3 in 
columns 10 and 12. The latter ranking is more consistent with the 
outcomes of the samples of major innovations. 
III.2. Discussion and Test of the Indicator 
IIIi2ij_i_The_Band-Wagon_H2£o thesis 
Do the innovation cases from the Feinman/Fuentevilla sample concentrate 
in the same sectors as do the major innovations from the inter-war 
period? The rank scales in table 2 of the Appendix (columns 6, 8, 10 
and 12) give support to the "band-wagon" hypothesis in the case of 
aircraft construction, plastics manufacturing, chemical and electrical 
industry which in'all the four lists take high rankings. However, there 
are four industries that need some more explanation: car industry, 
precision engineering/opties, shipbuilding and non-ferrous metals. 
Comparing the Mensch/Jewkes list with the Mahdavi sample it turned out 
that the category "scientific instruments" (which in the Mahdavi sample 
becomes particularly important during the 1960's) is somewhat badly 
represented in the Mensch list which was already compiled in the mid 
24) 
1950's. Within the DlW-classification scheme, the scientific 
instruments innovationsfrom the Feinman/Fuentevilla sample have been 
grouped to the "precision engineering and opties industry". The high 
ranking of this industry in the present ranklist of innovation intensity 
confirms the impression from the Mahdavi sample that the outcome from 
the Mensch-Jewkes list needs correction: scientific instruments production 
should be regarded as a Schumpeterian industry during the post-war period. 
Another problem is the low ranking of car-industry. My grouping of the . 
car industry as a Schumpeterian industry has been criticized by Clark/ 
Freeman/Soete: "In our view the extremely important influence of the 
car-industry ... in the post-war boom in Europe and Japan cannot be 
attributed mainly to technical innovations as such (as it could be in the 
third Kondratieff) but is to be explained rather more in terms of the 
high income elasticity of demand for cars and the international diffusion 
25) 
of the original US technology ...". Indeed, neither the Mensch/Jewkes 
list nor the Mahdavi sample cover too many cases of major innovations in 
the car industry. Thus they are consistent with the medium ranking position 
of this industry in table 2. 
Judging about the influence of innovations on sectoral growth patterns, 
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however, the inter-sectoral systems character of innovations should 
not be forgotten. Before the irmovation thrust of the 1930's, there 
were two important obstacles to the expansion of the car industry 
which could not be overcome by automobile producers themselves: 
expensive gasoline and the problem of knocking in the engine. Both 
problems have been solved by the innovation of the continuous 
catalytic cracking process (1942) and the anti-knock gasoline (1935). 
From this I conclude that (besides the factors named by Clark/Freeman/ 
Soete) innovation did exercise an important influence on the car 
industry. In spite of the relatively modest innovation performance of 
the industry itself, the close links with innovative activity in the 
petroleum industry explain a second career of automobiles (as a mass-
product) during the post-war period after their career as a luxury 
product in the 1920's. 
A somewhat surprising result in the present ranklist is the relatively 
high ranking of the shipbuilding and the non-ferrous metals industries 
which stands in contrast to the relatively poor innovation performance 
of these industries in the other two samples. Here, a weak point in 
my above procedure becomes manifest: The ranklists of innovations are 
constructed by adding up numbers of innovations irrespective of their 
type (product or process innovations). Obviously, different types of 
innovations have different impacts on economie growth. There may be 
old industries which have few new products but a lot of process 
innovations. In the above ranklist they appear as "innovative" as 
younger industries that have the same number of innovations but a more 
favourable mix between innovation types. It would be interesting to 
check whether a ranklist of innovativeness that is built on a 
differentiation between types of innovations will show a result that 
is more consistent with the other two samples. However, such a 
differentiation is not possible because Feinman/Fuentevilla wanted to 
assure secrecy for the innovating firms by separating the description 
of innovations from the data about innovation year, innovating sector, 
etc. Thus there is no other chance than to take the data without 
further classification. Are they nonetheless suitable for the purpose 
of testing the "band-wagon" hypothesis? Certainly they are, insofar 
as the following assumption is realistic: A successful market introduction 
does not only require a superior quality of the innovative product, but 
also an attractive price to withstand substitution competition against es-
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stablished products. Therefore the major innovations of the 1930's 
and 40's are supposed to be foliowed by series of related product 
innovations, quality augmenting improvements and by cost reducing 
process innovations. Adding up all these different innovations we 
should principally get an above average innovation intensity in 
those sectors which were affected by major innovations. This is 
indeed the case: Aircraft construction, scientific instruments, 
plastics manufacturing, petroleum refining, electrical equipment, 
chemical industry and car industry take rankings that are quite 
consistent with the outcome from the Mahdavi sample (and - with the 
modifications discussed above - also with the Mensch sample). Insofar 
the "band-wagon" hypothesis receives strong support, even if the 
construction procedure of table 2 remains vulnerable as to "old" 
industries such as shipbuilding with their supposed rationalization 
bias. 
IIIi2i2i_The_Continuit2;_H222tiiêËiË 
Looking at the average distribution of innovations from 1953 to 1973, 
the hypothesis of a "band-wagon" effect receives indeed support: 
Postwar innovative activity as measured by the Feinman/Fuentevilla 
sample has a strong tendency to move along the path which was initiated 
by major innovations. It has to be asked now: Is the average degree of 
innovativeness for the entire 21 year investigation period a realistic 
measure of the sectoral distribution of innovations from the 1950's 
to the 1970's? In other words: Is the observed sectoral distribution 
pattern fairly continuous over the whole 21 years or are there important 
inter-industry shifts in innovative activity? 
Table 3 of the Appendix provides for a test on the continuity 
hypothesis. The investigation period is subdivided into 3 seven year 
periods (1953-1959, 1960-1966, 1967-1973), and the innovations per sector 
are grouped by these sub-periods according to their innovation years as 
given by Feinman/Fuentevilla. Calculating the coefficients of correlation 
between the series of the individual sub-periods and between these sub-
periods and the series of the entire 21 year period, the following 
results have been achieved: 
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a) non-weighted innovations (413 cases) 
1953-1973 1953-1959 1960-1966 
1953-1959 0.906 - 0.845 
1960-1966 0.977 0.845 -
1967-1973 0.972 0.812 0.934 
b) weighted innovations (379 cases) 
1953-1973 1953-1959 1960-1966 
1953-1959 0.936 - 0.902 
1960-1966 0.990 0.902 -
1967-1973 0.979 0.864 0.963 
From the above coefficients I conclude that there has been no 
significant shift in the sectoral distribution of innovations within 
27} 
the 21 year mvestigation period. In other words: There is a clear 
tendency for innovative activity to concentrate in certain sectors of 
industry, and this tendency remains relatively constant over a 
considerable period of time. 
IIIi2^3^_The_Innovation_Effect_Hy_2££hesis 
Because of the relative continuity in the sectoral distribution of 
innovations it is possible to work with a relatively simple testing 
procedure when looking at the correspondence between innovativeness 
and growth performance of industries: We can just use the "innovation 
intensities" for the entire 21 year period as calculated in table 2 of 
the Appendix, and confront them with the indicator of growth. As an 
indicator of growth, the average growth rates of industrial net production 
28^ 
will be taken. They are documented in table 4 of the Appendix. 
As Feinman/Fuentevilla investigated their innovation cases on an 
international level, it is certainly not adequate to assume a direct 
connection between all of these innovations and economie growth. 
Gorrelations may as well be created in an indirect way, for example 
by the foreign investment mechanism and/or by the international transfer 
of licences. Needless to say that the correlation coefficients do not 
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teil us anything about causalities. Thus the coefficients below are 
nothing but a measure of the degree to which in West German industry 
sectoral patterns of production growth do or do not correspond with the 
sectoral distribution of innovative activity on an international level. 
From table 4 of the Appendix it can be easily recognized that during 
the time span from 1951 to 1977 there are significant changes in 
sectoral production growth. Therefore I preferred to take the 
correlations between "innovation intensities" and growth for longer 
time-spans as well as for short and successive periods. All the 
beginning and end years of these periods are years of business cycle 
29") peaks, according to the business cycle chronology of P.A. K l e m . 
In a first step, the growth rates of table 4 were correlated as they 
are with the respective innovation intensities. As the individual 
sectors are quite different in size, this is a relatively rough 
procedure, because each sector enters the correlation test with the 
same weight. Therefore the test was repeated, weighting each sector 
according to its relative share in total production as documented 
in column 3 of table 2 (Appendix). In general, the latter coefficients 
should be more reliable. They are documented in the following table; 
the respective non-weighted correlation coefficients which were 
calculated in the first step are documented in brackets. 
Table 2: Innovation Intensities of Sectors (I. ... I.) correlated with 
Growth Rates of Production (table 4, Appendix) 
Growth Rates of Production * 
1951-65 1951-70 1951-73 1951-55 1955-61 1961-65 1965-70 1970-73 1973-77 
h 0.54 (0.75) 0.55 (0.76) 
0.54 
(0.75) 
0.45 
(0.70) 
0.50 
(0.71) 
0.46 
(0.59) 
0.52 
(0.61) °'
3C (0.28 ) 
++ 0.11 
(-0.09 ) 
h 0.57 (0.80) 0.57 (0.81) 0.56 (0.80) 0.47 (0.76) 0.56 (0.77) 0.43 (0.57) 0.51 (0.62) °'
32t+ (0.29 ) 0.10++ (-o.ii ) 
h 0.71 (0.90) 0.70 (0.90) 0.68 (0.88) 0.51 (0.78) 0.71 (0.88) 0.60 (0.64) 0.56 (0.65) °-
32t+ (0.30 ) -0.04
++ 
(-0.27++) 
\ 
0.72 
(0.93) 
0.71 
(0.92) 
0.68 
(0.91) 
0.52 
(0.80) 
0.75 
(0.91) 
0.56 
(0.60) 
0.54 
(0.65) °'
32t+ (0.30 ) (-0.29 ) 
Note: ++ = correlation coëfficiënt is not significantly different from zero 
+ = correlation coëfficiënt is different from zero at an 0.05 level of 
significance 
no sign = correlation coëfficiënt is different from zero at an 0.01 
level of significance 
From table 2 it becomes evident, that the "innovation intensity of the 
labour force" (I , I.) is much better correlated with growth rates of 
production than the "innovation intensity of production". This is 
remarkable, because in the above discussion it could be stated that 
the rankscales of I, and I, (cf. columns 9 and 11 in table 2 of the 
Appendix) are more harmonie with the outcomes from samples of major 
innovations. 
In spite of differences in the absolute level, the coefficients for all 
the four innovation intensities tend to move into the same direction. 
A relatively weaker level of correlation is to be observed for the 
1951-55 period. For this period some influence of a reconstruction boom 
cannot be ignored. As can be seen from table 4 (App.) there are several 
industries with impressive growth rates from 1951 to 55 which after 
return to a much more modest growth performance. The disturbance of the 
innovation effect by the reconstruction boom seems to fade out quickly, 
and in the 1955-61 period the correlation becomes stronger (and in the 
case of I_ and I, even remarkably stronger). Starting from the impact 
of major innovations on economie growth as outlined in the introduction 
to this paper, we should expect that moving away from the cluster of 
major innovations, the correspondence between the distribution of 
innovations over sectors and sectoral production growth should be 
gradually weakening. This can indeed be substantiated from table 2. 
The pattern of weakening correlations during the 1960's and 70's is 
especially clear for the "innovation intensity of the labour force". 
Ill_12.4._Further discussion 
How to explain the decline of positive correlations? I suggest the 
following hypothesis: Over the "life cycle" of new Schumpeterian 
industries, the increasing maturity of products, the tendency to 
standardization, a higher degree of mechanization in the production 
process etc. make it increasingly difficult to implement further 
radical innovations. A decline of innovation performance may occur in 
3 ways: 
1') the absolute number of innovations may decline; 
2) the degree of radicalness of innovations may diminish; 
3) the composition of the innovation volume may change; i.e. 
there may be a shift from product to process innovations. 
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The three above possibilities are not mutually exclusive. Is there 
some empirical evidence of a decline in the degree of innovativeness? 
The Feinmann/Fuentevilla data do not teil us anything about the first 
point: In the intertemporal dimension, the innovation cases are not 
30) 
selected randomly . Takmg Dutch and German patent figures as another 
indicator of "band waggon" innovations I discovered, that there are 
indeed fluctuations in the absolute level which show some adherence to 
Kondratieff-long waves. These data cannot be presented here; nonetheless 
31) 
ït should be noted that they give some evidence on the above point 1 
The secohd point receives empirical support directly from the Feinman/ 
Fuentevilla data, looking at table 3 of the Appendix: Whereas from the 
second to the third seven ye.ar period the total number of non-weighted 
innovations increases from 138 to 160, the sum of innovations which are 
multiplied by their degree of radicalness declines from 556 to 449. This 
decline in absolute terms is quite remarkable because it occurs within 
an economy which is still growing, even if it grows with declining rates. 
The third argument about the changing ratio of process to product 
innovations has been investigated by G. Mensen. 
Grouping the Feinman/Fuentevilla sample by types of innovations, Mensch 
concluded that there is a shift from "expansionary" to "rationalizing" 
. 32) innovations over time 
Certainly, these arguments give only a preliminary evidence on the 
above hypothesis. However, it should not be forgotten to mention that 
they are consistent with results from other research. Already S. Kuznets 
33) 
referred to Julius Wolf's "laws of retardation of progress" and tried 
to illustrate that there is a "diminution in the number or importance 
34) 
of inventions as an industry grows older" 
A study of Freeman et al. demonstrated a shifting from product to 
35) process innovations in the plastics mdustry , and m a more recent 
paper J.M. Utterback tried to illustrate that such a shifting model 
could have a more general importance . The investment test of the 
German IFO-Institute (Munich) gives an indirect support on such 
hypotheses when stating that during the last decade the ratio of 
"expansionary" to "rationalizing" investment in West German industry 
. 37) is shifting in favour of the rationalization motive 
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IV. SOME SPECULATION ABOUT POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In the present crisis, the saturation tendency of most of the original 
growth industries becomes manifest. Therefore a common Keynesian 
policy of demand stimulation may have only a limited effect. On the 
other hand, monetarist strategies may lead from bad to worse: Many 
of the matured innovation products are durable consumer goods with a 
high income elasticity of demand. Hence a policy of income re-distribution 
in favour of profits will reinforce the recession trend. As to anti-crisis 
policy, income policy proves to be a thread that can be thrown but not 
pushed. At present, in Great Britain it is being thrown. 
What is the role of demand bringing about the rise of new Schumpeterian 
industries? As already mentioned above, the thrust-wise achievement of 
major innovations during the 1930's has to be interpreted carefully: 
Even if a stagnation trend in existing lines of production is necessary 
as an incentive for a reorientation, innovative solutions are not 
supposed to come from those industries which are the most hit by the 
crises. Moreover, there is a considerable influence of government demand 
for military purposes. Here the "indirect" depression-trigger effect as 
outlined by Clark/Freeman/Soete seems to be relevant: "... the social 
tensions and conflicts engendered by such depressions, and especially 
by mass unemployment, may lead to radical changes of various kinds 
which in turn may provide a more hospitable environment for basic 
innovations. This would encompass the rise of the Hitler regime and 
German rearmament". The lesson to be learnt from history should be 
to recognize the importance of government demand for the breakthrough 
of innovations; a "Schumpeter-Keynes" strategy of innovation support 
by deficit financed state expenditures could direct innovative activity 
on peaceful paths before the depression will become so strong that 
authoritarian regimes and war strategies will become most likely to 
dominate. 
Once a major innovation is introduced into the market, the stream of 
related "band-wagon" innovations should be decisive for the range and 
the speed of its diffusion. What is the relationship between these 
related innovations and demand? In figure 1, those cases from the 
Feinman/Fuentevilla sample which were innovated in the U.S.A. are drawn 
over time on a yearly basis. In the same figure I included a sketch of 
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Figure 1: 319 U.S. Innovations from 1953-1973 and U.S. Business Cycle Pa t te rn 
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peak and trough years of the U.S. business cycle according to the 
business cycle chronology mentioned in reference 29. As 63% of the 
sample are U.S. innovations, the quantitative basis of figure 1 is 
relatively broad. The rest of the sample is distributed as follows: 
United Kingdom: 17%, West Germany: 7%, Japan: 7%, Franee: 4%, and 
Canada: 2%. In the latter countries, the random element in the 
distribution pattern might be quite strong, because of the much smaller 
39) 
number of cases. Therefor only the U.S. data are presented here. 
Looking at the distribution of the U.S. innovations, some correspondence 
with the business cycle pattern cannot be ignored. The main peaks of 
the innovation series are either identical with the business cycle peaks 
(as in 1960, 1962, and probably in 1953) or have a lag of one year 
(1956, 1968, 1972). Only the innovation peak of 1964, and two small 
peaks at 1958 and 1970 fall into a trough year (or, to express it more 
positively: They occur at the turning point of a new upswing). It should 
be noted that none of the innovation peaks occurs during the time span 
between peak and trough. Thus figure 1 is consistent with the view that 
innovations are launched when market prospects are positive, and that 
depression slows down the flow of innovations. Sceptics who might argue 
that the adherence between business cycles and innovation cycles could 
be accidental, should remind that the data of figure 1 are even biased 
against the hypothesis of a cyclical pattern (see footnote 30). 
Looking at the discussion of the "band-wagon hypothesis", the "continuity 
hypothesis", and the "innovation effect hypothesis" in chapter III it is 
tempting to assume that causality runs from innovation to demand: The 
rise of Schumpeterian growth industries appears to be determined by major 
innovations, i.e. demand is the strongest within the highly innovative 
sectors. On the other hand it has to be recognized that the market 
introduction rhythm of innovations is considerably influenced by the 
general status of the business cycle, i.e. by demand. This should 
interdict us to install clear-cut relationships ("demand is determined 
by the flow of innovations", or vice versa). Rather a model of mutual 
causation seems to be appropriate. The interrelationship between demand 
expansion (contraction) and launching (withholding) of innovations may 
shed another light on the relative success of Keynesian demand management 
during the periods of rapid growth. 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
As already mentioned above, there are numerous methodological 
difficulties for testing the existence of so-called Kondratieff-
cycles during the last 150 or 200 years in the expansion rhythm 
of the capitalist world economy. Thus the debates between long wave 
believers and sceptics are likely to go on. Whatever be the outcome 
of further time series analysis: It is tempting to interprete the 
present situation from the background of longer-term changes in the 
rhythm of economie growth. Without claiming strong periodicity of 
such growth fluctuations, it can be stated that the prosperity period 
from the end of the 1940's to the end of the 1960's (or to the 
beginning of the 1970's) has the "ideal" length of a "Kondratieff 
upswing" ("A-period"), and that the depression of the 1930's as well 
as the present crises phenomena certainly exceed the range of a common 
business cycle contraction. 
The hypothesis that major innovations tend to concentrate during such 
periods of prolonged crises ("B-periods") has been strongly criticized. 
It is the merit of this criticism to have once more drawn attention to 
the difficult and complex nature of the innovation process: Entering 
a "B-period", the economy does not "automatically" produce a cluster 
of major innovations that will provide for a new A-period. Perhaps we 
will have to find a notion better than "depression-triggering", because 
the primary reason for the observed clustering tendencies seems to be 
that during prosperity periods there are few incentives for radical 
innovations. According to my argument, during A-periods firms are forced 
by competition to concentrate their R & D facilities on already 
existing lines of production instead of initiating new ones. Economie 
distress alters this situation, giving strong incentives to alter R & D 
strategies, and to implement radical innovations, but at the same time 
it increases the risks of doing so. This contradictory situation 
certainly needs more future investigations, and scholars of the 
innovation process may learn a lot about the dangers in the years before 
us, when studying the social and political context of the innovation 
cluster during the 1930's. 
This paper dealt with the question, in how far three innovation samples 
from independent sources and collected with different methods are 
compatible in their final outcome. It can be stated that there are 
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relationships between the samples in an intertemporal as well as in an 
intersectoral perspective: The hypothesis that major innovations 
cluster during B-periods is confirmed by the Mahdavi sample, and the 
sectoral distribution of the Mahdavi data corresponds relatively well 
with that of the Feinman/Fuentevilla sample. The sectoral distribution 
of the latter sample remains relatively constant during the entire 21 
year investigation period. Moreover, during the A-period of rapid 
growth in West German industry, the innovation intensities of sectors 
are closely correlated with the speed of sectoral production growth. 
The transition into a B-period of slower growth is accompanied by a 
decline of positive correlations. 
Certainly, the analysis of innovation effects could be further extended, 
including forward and backward linkages of new Schumpeterian industries, 
their need of specific infrastructure investment, etc; last but not 
least critics may demand to analize the whole matter on a finer level 
of desaggregation: Sectors like "chemical industry" or "electrical 
equipment" cover a mixture of highly innovative and of old and matured 
products. Nonetheless it is remarkable that even with such a rougher 
classification a strong correlation between innovativeness and speed of 
growth is observable. The above results suggest that, during the West 
German "Wirtschaftswunder"-period, innovation had an outstanding 
importance for the development of sectoral production structures, and 
that the present period of growth weakness is associated with a weaker 
innovation performance. This should be reason enough to do further 
research about the vulnerable points of the above approach, and about 
the questions which remain open. 
- 24 " 
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Appendix, Table 1 
DISTRIBUTION OF INNOVATIONS OVER SECTORS (Standard Industrial ClassificationJ 
SIC-
No. 
SIC-sectors R M 
1 
1 
IMP I NO. ? 
1 
DIW-
Class. 
BB 
109 
121 
131 
Miscellaneous Metal Ores 
Bitum. Coal 8 Lignite Mining 
Crude Petroleum 8 Nat. gas 
1 
1 
1 
154 
161 
162 
173 
Non Resident.Buildg.Constr. 
Highway & Street Constr. 
Heavy Constr.(exc.Highway) 
Electrical Work 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
n.c. 
203 
208 
209 
Preserved Fruits 8 Vegetables 
Beverages 
Misc. Foods 8 Kindred Products 
1 
1 
1 NG 
222 
228 
Weaving Mills, Synthetics 
Yam 8 Thread Mills 
1 
1 
TEXT 
231 Men's and Boys' Suits 8 Coats BEKL 
242 Sawmills & Planing Mills 1 SH 
243 
249 
Millwork, Plywood 8 Struct. 
Members 
Miscellaneous Wood Products 
1 
1 
HV 
261 Pulp Mills 1 ZP 
262 Paper Mills exc. Buildg.Paper 1 1 PV 
281 
282 
283 
284 
285 
286 
287 
289 
Industrial Inorganic Chemicals 
Plastics Mat. 8 Synthetics 
Drugs 
Soap, Cleaners 8 Toilet Goods 
Paints 8 Allied Products 
Industrial Organic Chemicals 
Agricultural Chemicals 
Miscellaneous Chem. Products 
1 
4 
5 
1 
1 
1 
3 
5 
1 
3 
3 
1 
2 
1 
4 1 1 
1 1 1 
4 
1 
1 
CHEM 
291 Petroleum Refining 4 2 1 MINV 
301 Tires 8 Inner Tubes 2 2 1 KA 
307 Miscellaneous Plastics Prod. 3 4 2 4 KV 
311 Leather Tanning 8 Finishing 1 LV 
321 Flat Glass 2 2 GLAS 
324 
325 
327 
329 
Cement Hydraulic 
Structural Clay Products 
Concrete, Gypsum 8 Piaster 
Prod. 
Misc.Nonmetalic Mineral Prod. 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
4 3 
STE 
331 Blast Furnace 8 Basic Steel 
Prod. 2 5 11 1 EST 
333 
334 
335 
Primary Nonferron Metals 
Secondary Nonferrous Metals 
Nonferrous Rolling 8 Drawing 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
NEM 
339 Misc. Primary Metal Products 1 EST 
344 Fabr. Struct. Metal Products 1 2 STB 
345 
347 
349 
Screw Mach. Prod. Bolts, etc. 
Metal Services, nee. 
Misc. Fabricated Metal Prod. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
ESBM 
351 
353 
354 
355 
356 
357 
358 
359 
Engines 8 Turbines 
Constr. 8 Related Machinery 
Metalworking Machinery 
Special Industry Machinery 
General Industrial Machinery 
Office 8 Computing Machines 
Refrigeration 8 Service Mach. 
Misc. Mach., Except Electrical 
3 
1 
5 
2 
6 
3 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
2 3 1 
1 3 1 
2 
4 
1 
MB 
362 
365 
Electr. Ind. Apparatus 
Radio 8 TV Receiving Equipm. 
3 3 
2 
3 
ELT 
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Appendix, Table 1 Ccont.3 
sic- SIC-sectors R M IMP I NO. ? DIW-
No. 
4 
9 
5 
5 .-* 1 
Class. 
ELT 
366 
367 
Communication Equipment 
Electr. Components 8 Access. 
3 
7 
369 Misc. Electr. Equipm.8 Suppl. 1 3 
371 Motor Vehicles 8 Equipment 3 3 6 1 2 FB 
372 Aircraft 8 Parts 7 1 7 1 LB 
373 Ship & Boat Buildg. 8 Repairg. 2 4 SCHB 
374 Railroad Equipment 1 1 1 n.c. 
376 Guided Missiles, Space Vehicles 
Parts 1 
LB 
381 Engineering 8 Scientific Instr .1 3 2 
382 Measuring 8 Controll. Devices 2, 2 1 
383 
384 
386 
Qptical Instruments 8 Lenses 
Medical Instr. 8 Supplies 
Photograph. Equipm. S Supplies 
2 
3 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 5 3 
F0 
393 Musical Instruments 1 MUSS 
401 Railroads 1 2 
422 
431 
Public Warehousing 
U.S. Postal Service 1 
1 
3 1 
442 
452 
Deep Sea Domestic Transp. 
Noncertif. Air Transportation 
1 
1 
461 
481 
Pipe Lines, Except Natural Gas 
Telephone Communication 2 
1 1 
483 
489 
Radio 8 TV Broadcasting 
Communication Services, nee 
1 
1 
491 
494 
495 
508 
632 
737 
Electric Services 
Water Supply 
Sanitary Services 
Machinery, Equipment 8 Suppl. 
Med. Service 8 Health Insur. 
Computer 8 Data Process.Serv. 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
n.c. 
739 
769 
806 
891 
Misc. Business Serv. 
Misc. Repair Shops 
Hospitals 
Engineering 8 Architect.Serv. 
1 
1 
1 
4 1 5 
1 
1 
892 
919 
Noncommercial Research Organiz 
General Government, nee 
• 
1 
1 
1 
957 
962 
Environmental Quality 8 Housin 
Regulation, Admin. of Transp. 
g 
1 
1 
Abbrevations 
PV = 
R = Radical breakthrough CHEM= 
M = Major technological shift MINV= 
IMP = Improvement KA = 
I = Imitation KV = 
ND = No new technological knowledge LV = 
required GLAS= 
? = Not known STE = 
BB = Mining EST = 
n.c.= not covered by manufacturing NEM = 
or mining industry STB = 
NG = Food, Tobacco 8 Beverages ESBM= 
TEXT= Textiles MB = 
BEKL= Clothing ELT = 
SH = Saw-Mill 8 Timber Processing FB = 
HV = Wood Manufacture LB = 
ZP = Woodworking, Cellulose, SCHB= 
Paperboard F0 = 
MUSS= 
Data source: see reference 21 
Paper 8 Board Manufact. 
Chemical Ind. Cincl. fibres) 
Petroleum Refining 
Rubber 8 Asbestos 
Plastics Manufacture 
Leather Processing 
Glass Industry 
Industry of Building Materials 
Iron 8 Steel Industry 
Non-ferrons Metals 
Steel Construction 
Hardware 8 Metall Goods 
Machinery Construction 
Electrical Equipment 
Vehicle Construction 
Aircraft Construction 
Shipbuilding 
Precision Engineering 8 Opties 
Musical Instr., Toys, Jewelery, etc. 
non- weighted 
Appendix, Table 2: weighted innova-
innova- tions 
Sectoral Innovation Intensities tions 
(1953-73) (1953-73) 
413 cases 319 cases 
(1) (2) 
Mining 7 30 
Industry of Building Materials 17 67 
Iron & Steel Industry 26 89 
Non-ferrous Metals io 34 
Chemical Ind. (incl. chem. fibres) 61 218 
Petroleum Refining 9 30 
Rubber, Asbestos 8 26 
Saw-Mill & Timber Processing 1 4 
Wood-Working, Cellulose, Paperboard 1 6 
Steel Construction 3 14 
Machinery Construction 63 227.5 
Vehicle Construction 21 64 
Shipbuilding 7 32 
Aircraft Construction 20 82 
Electrical Equipment 62 243 
Precision Engineering & Opties 47 155.5 
Hardware & Metal Goods 13, 34 
Fine Ceramic Industry 0 0 
Glass Industry 6 22 
Wood Manufacture 2 8 
Musical Instr., Toys, Jewelry, etc. 1 4 
Paper & Board Manufact. 3 7 
Printing & Duplicating 0 0 
Plastics Manufacture 16 63 
Leather Production 0 0 
Leather Processing 1 6 
Shoe Industry 0 0 
Textiles 3 6 
Clothing 1 5.5 
Food, Tobacco & Bevërages 4 17 
Data sources: see references 21 and 22. 
% share % share Innovatior i Inten 
in 
total 
in 
total 
of Production 
(6) 
produc- employ- ran-
tion in ment in king 
1963 1963 (5) = of (7) = 
(3) (4) (D:(3) (5) (2):(3 
6.02 6.26 1.16 19 4.98 
3.61 3.14 4.71 11 18.56 
6.38 6.80 4.08 12 13.95 
1.24 1.32 8.06 5 27.42 
7.94 6.15 7.68 6 27.46 
3.08 0.37 2.92 14 9.74 
1.23 1.40 6.50 8 21.14 
0.87 1.00 1.15 20 4.60 
0.93 0.99 1.08 21 6.45 
2.87 2.72 1.05 22 4.88 
12.09 12.63 5.21 10 18.82 
6.75 5.51 3.11 13 9.48 
0.69 1.02 10.14 4 46.38 
0.50 0.34 40.00 1 164.00 
8.38 11.12 7.40 7 29.00 
1.36 1.84 34.56 2 114.34 
6.11 6.62 2.13 17 5.56 
0.76 1.02 0 28.5 0 
1.00 1.11 6 9 22 
2.22 2.64 0.90 23 3.60 
0.58 0.71 1.72 18 6.90 
1.31 1.47 2.29 16 5.34 
2.66 2.48 0 28.5 0 
0.96 1.24 16.67 3 65.63 
0.30 0.36 0 28.5 0 
0.41 0.50 2.44 15 14.63 
0.83 1.23 0 28.5 0 
4.88 6.93 0.61 24 1.23 
3.09 4.70 0.32 26 •1.78 
10.90 6.39 0.37 25 1.56 
Appendix, Table 3: I N N 0 V A T I O N S 
without 
Distribution of Innovations over Sectors during information < about degree 
3 Seven Year Periods c Df radicalness 
Numbers of corresponding 1953- 1960- 1967- 1953-
DlW-sectors SIC-sectors 1959 1966 1973 1973 
Mining 109, 121, 131 4 0 3 7 
Industry of Building Materials 324, 325, 327, 329 3 8 6 17 
Iron & Steel Industry 331, 339 6 12 8 26 
Non-ferrous Metals 333-335 5 1 4 10 
Chemical Ind. (incl. chem. fibres) 281, 282-287, 289 20 19 22 61 
Petroleum Refining 291 1 3 5 9 
Rubber & Asbestos 301 5 1 2 8 
Saw-Mill & Timber Processing 242 1 0 0 1 
Wood-Working, Cellulose, Paperboard 261 1 0 0 1 
Steel Construction 344 1 1 1 3 
Machinery Construction 351, 353-359 15 26 22 63 
Vehicle Construction 371 8 5 8 21 
Shipbuilding 373 4 1 2 7 
Aircraft Construction 372, 376 6 6 8 20 
Electrical Equipment 360, 362, 365-367, 369 11 24 27 62 
Precision Engineering & Opties 381-384, 386 6 14 27 47 
Hardware & Metal Goods 341, 347, 349, 342 4 5 4 13 
Fine Ceramic Industry 0 0 0 0 
Glass Industry 321 3 1 2 6 
Wood Manufacture 243, 249 2 0 0 2 
Musical Instr., Toys, Jewelry, etc. 393 1 0 0 1 
Paper & Board Manufact. 262 1 1 1 3 
Printing & Duplicating 0 0 0 0 
Plastics Manufacture 307 3 7 6 16 
Leather Production 0 0 0 0 
Leather Processing 311 0 0 1 1 
Shoe-Industry 0 0 0 0 
Textiles 222, 228 3 0 0 3 
Clothing 231 0 0 1 1 
Food, Tobacco & Beverages 203, 206, 208, 209 1 3 0 4 
Total 115 138 160 
At /"» Q 1 T»Q 
413 
o o Tn 
Note: In a tew cases, Feinman/iruenteviiia give a vaiue Deiweeu LWU uegiees UJ. iauj.i_aj.ucoo. J.U 
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